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ABSTRACT 
This paper aims to contribute to debates about humanitarian governance and insecurity in post-conflict 
situations. It takes the case of South Sudan to explore the relations between humanitarian agencies, the 
international community, and local authorities, and the ways international and local forms of power 
become interrelated and contested, and to what effect. The paper is based on eight months of 
ethnographic research in various locations in South Sudan between 2011 and 2013, in which 
experiences with and approaches to insecurity among humanitarian aid actors were studied. The 
research found that many security threats can be understood in relation to the everyday practices of 
negotiating and maintaining humanitarian access. Perceiving this insecurity as violation or abuse of a 
moral and practical humanitarianism neglects how humanitarian aid in practice was embedded in 
broader state building processes. This paper posits instead that much insecurity for humanitarian actors 
is a symptom of the blurring of international and local forms of power, and which mediates the 
development of a humanitarian protectorate.     
 
INTRODUCTION 
Humanitarian action is increasingly understood as part of peace-building agendas and is 
associated with processes of global governance, in which international actors manage and 
intervene in the sovereign affairs of conflict-affected and fragile states in intimate ways 
(Duffield 2007; Agier 2011; Barnett 2011; Donini 2012; Fassin 2012). It is related to the will 
to transform societies and build states that are able to deal with political conflict in ways that 
don’t result in war (Duffield 2002; Bliesemann de Guevara 2012a: 15). Simultaneously 
however, humanitarian action also remains a particular field of principled activities that aspire 
to aid people in need, separated from other forms of collaborative international engagement 
and power. This presents us with a paradox of humanitarianism: what happens under its label 
                                                 
* Thanks go to Prof. Dr. Dorothea Hilhorst and Prof. Dr. Bram Büscher, and two anonymous reviewers at the 
Journal of Modern African Studies for their insightful comments on this text. The fieldwork was supported by 
the Dutch Organisation for Social Scientific Research (NWO-Wotro).    
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is both embedded in political processes of post-conflict state building and exceptional as 
principled emergency relief.  
 
However, the ways in which this paradox materializes in practice, and the specific challenges 
that result from this, are poorly understood. Much academic debate tends to shy away from 
this ambiguous paradox and perceives this as a politicization, erosion or misunderstanding of 
a pure and moral humanitarianism, or as unintended consequences of a mandate shift in which 
humanitarianism somehow got mixed up with geo-political interests and aspirations. These 
understandings fail to grasp how contemporary humanitarian governance is a manifestation of 
the internationalization of non-western states, in which international and local forms of power 
are blurred. This is not action gone wrong, or a misunderstanding of norms and principles, but 
rather a post-political humanitarianism that takes on governmental aspirations, but is too 
narrowly understood, legitimized and communicated as normative, principal and practical 
action.  
 
In this paper I take the case of South Sudan to explore this paradox of humanitarian aid as 
both exceptional and embedded action, and the consequent blurring of international and local 
forms of power and its effects. In December 2013 South Sudan relapsed into civil war after a 
peace agreement in 2005 and separation from Sudan in 2011 had allowed for a fragile peace. 
After the escalation at the end of 2013, questions arose over whether the international 
community, a broad assemblage of actors comprised of the UN, donor states, international 
NGOs and other actors, had allowed for, or even fostered, the escalation of the political 
situation in the new state. This followed the idea that war, peace and intervention produced a 
state in which the international community was accorded, and accorded itself, a place and 
influence in the governance of the new country.  
 
This was not uncontested however, and over the years aid actors were increasingly faced with 
hostility, threats, appropriations of aid assets, and insecurity at the hands of local authorities. 
In this context, the maintenance of humanitarian aid roles in South Sudan necessitated 
continuous negotiations with local authorities, that increasingly appropriated, hindered, 
frustrated or attacked aid efforts, or threatened to do so, or allowed this to occur by third 
parties. Usual explanations about this form of insecurity dwell on the South Sudanese 
authorities as dysfunctional, inexperienced, corrupt or nepotistic, and offer limited reflection 
on humanitarianism itself, and its relations with the authorities and power holders in South 
3 
 
Sudan. Instead, in this paper I analyse how processes of negotiating humanitarian access 
contributed to the consolidation of a particular political economy of aid, in which insecurity 
played a mediating role. It offers an understanding of insecurity facing aid agencies, and the 
ways this is managed, that recognises the ambiguous roles that humanitarian agencies 
themselves occupied in the creation and maintaining of what can be visualised as a 
humanitarian protectorate in South Sudan.  
   
WAR TO PEACE AND BACK AGAIN 
On the evening of 15 December 2013, shootings broke out in the Giada Barracks of the 
Sudanese People’s Liberation Army (SPLA) in Juba, the capital of South Sudan. As the 
violence escalated over the following days, it spread from the barracks further into Juba, and 
then to the north, onto the towns of Bor and Malakal. It was unclear what exactly happened in 
these first hours and days. Explanations for the escalation ranged from a coup attempt by the 
deposed Vice-President Riak Machar – which was the official government line, to a forced 
disarmament of Nuer soldiers in the Presidential Guards Brigade, a mutiny that had triggered 
a violent response, to ethnic struggles within the Sudan People’s Liberation Movement 
(SPLM) (D. H. Johnson 2014; Thomas 2015). When President Salva Kirr emerged in a 
televised press conference in military uniform, it became clear that after only two and a half 
years of independence, South Sudan was experiencing an escalation of conflict that, unlike 
several other regional insurgencies that had been plaguing the county in the post-
independence years, had the potential to grow out into an all-out civil war. And it did. 
  
Relations between the main political leaders had already been sour for some time. As violence 
spread and became partly organized along ethnic lines, people used labels such as ‘ethnic 
conflict’ to explain the upsurge of war, while others constructed a more elaborate picture of 
how power politics in South Sudan is associated with patronage systems, and that ethnicity 
was only a partial driver for the conflict, and more a consequence than a cause.  
 
The latter genre of explanations implies that state power in South Sudan has been a matter of 
keeping various factions and potential volatile and disruptive elements in line by including 
them in a ‘kleptocratic elite’ (De Waal 2014). As a result, various pockets of rebellion that 
arose since (and before) independence have been dealt with by integrating rebel forces into 
the government army, and rewarding rebel factions with rents, or high positions in 
government or the army (Thomas 2015), indicating that the government instead of a 
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monolithic body, rather represented a herogenous constellation as the outcome of bargaining 
among contending elites (Twijnstra 2015). As a result of these patterns of patronage, a 
politico-military elite has consolidated a neo-patrimonial rule, more engaged with 
accommodating its power constituency than with building a viable state and state institutions 
(De Waal 2014; Pinaud 2014). State resources were siphoned off to this elite to such an extent 
that even the considerable resources that the new state had access to vanished into satisfying 
this patronage network and personal gain. In De Waal’s reading of the clashes, diminishing 
oil revenues due to an oil shutdown in the previous year, and plain greed, meant that by 2013 
there were no resources available to keep the patronage system running, and things fell apart. 
There were signs preceding this: political quarrels and the reshuffling in the ruling SPLM 
party and government earlier in 2013, such as the stripping of power of the Vice President.  
 
Corruption had been a word on many lips in the international community, including 
humanitarians, since the new state’s inception. Although presented as endemic, many donors 
and aid actors regarded corruption as an abuse of the system – a flaw which they targeted with 
their programmes of post-conflict state-building, with the intention of strengthening the very 
state institutions able to combat this abuse. Yet as De Waal (2014) argues, instead of an abuse 
of the system, corruption was the system. Similarly, Young notes: ‘under the guidance of the 
internationals the SPLA constructed a state in the image of the West, but it was only about 
appearances and virtually nothing functioned except the systematic looting of state coffers by 
its leaders’ (Sudan Tribune 2015).  
 
Where do the humanitarians who were operating in the post-conflict spectacle of South Sudan 
fit into this story? Many voices argued that South Sudan became independent too early, 
pushed by the US government, Hollywood stars such as George Clooney (D. H. Johnson 
2014: 301) and the political lobby of the self-proclaimed ‘Friends of South Sudan’1 that 
implemented the Sudanese peace negotiations as a form of “elite accommodation” (Sudan 
Tribune 2015). A leaked African Union report of the Commission of Inquiry on South Sudan, 
evaluating the ‘political meltdown’ after December 2013, places direct blame on the political 
backers and peace mongers of ‘the Troika’ (the US, the UK and Norway the main donors to 
the Comprehensive Peace Agreement (CPA), and holds them responsible for ‘its decisive role 
in framing an agreement that set up a politically unchallenged armed power in South Sudan, 
one that could act with impunity, thereby legitimizing both anyone holding a gun and the rule 
of the gun.’2 The report caused a public outcry and was withdrawn.3  
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These claims were pointed directly at donor states and the Troika or other unilateral or 
multilateral actors who were accorded a powerful role in steering and influencing South 
Sudanese politics, and not at humanitarian organisations, with their claim for a specific 
political niche that is distinct from the wider international arena. But on the ground, either 
more general forms of international assistance and donorship carried a humanitarian label in 
one way or another, or humanitarian agencies themselves were directly linked to or associated 
with the international aid system that was one of the driving forces in the post-conflict 
reconstruction of South Sudan.  
 
The suggestion that humanitarianism may have contributed to shaping an ‘abusive’ political 
economy of aid is strongly related to the ambiguous position of humanitarian action as both 
exceptional and embedded. There is a need to develop a more critical understanding of this 
ambiguity for three reasons. First, because the arbitrary use – or rather multiple 
understandings – of the label ‘humanitarian’ presents a taken-for-granted ambiguity that is 
problematic. It is an operational term, and is applied and acted upon by governments, donors, 
and aid agencies despite this ambiguity and may have certain effects, for instance with regard 
to understanding and approaching insecurity, as I will argue below.  
 
The humanitarian community itself is diffuse. It is an arena in which different actors operate 
under different labels, such as post-conflict reconstruction, emergency relief, humanitarian or 
development aid, capacity building and many more (Goodhand 2002; Hilhorst & Jansen 2010; 
Salomons 2015). Moreover, it is part of that wider international community, together with the 
UN apparatus, multilateral and donor organisations, states, individual (I)NGOs, private and 
military actors, in an ‘international community’ that is rarely defined (Veit 2010). Yet the 
label ‘humanitarian’ carries a distinctly different connotation than ‘aid’ or ‘development,’ and 
humanitarians position themselves vis-a-vis the state and others accordingly. The 
humanitarian principles neutrality, independence and impartiality serve as a way of self-
identification and legitimization, and are used – and believed – to claim safe access to people 
and territory. In this understanding, humanitarianism necessarily depends and acts on this 
image of action exceptional to the state and international politics. This ‘necessary fiction’ 
(Rieff 2011) thus sustains the taken-for-granted ambiguity of humanitarian aid.   
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Second, the suggestion that international actors contributed to the consolidation of the South 
Sudanese politico-military elite, and sustained their neo-patrimonial organisation, implicitly 
discerns this international support as something external to the state. Aid is, in many ways, 
part of a political economy of the state, and the suggestion that humanitarianism remains an 
external intervention rests upon a combination of what Smirl (2015) refers to as a 
‘humanitarian imaginary’, and an ideological and aspirational rationale of non-
governmentalism that becomes increasingly difficult to uphold. As others have noted, 
although humanitarian aid may start out as an external force, it becomes locally embedded 
once its programmes are being implemented, and increasingly comes to form what might be 
termed a form of hybrid governance (Büscher and Vlassenroot 2010; Veit 2010; Anderson 
2012; Bliesemann de Guevara 2012b). 
 
Third, much academic attention to (humanitarian) aid and peace-building is too ‘aid-centric’ 
and risks exaggerating the importance of aid and external aid interventions (Goodhand 2002: 
841; Barnett 2008; D. H. Johnson 2014). As a result these approaches accord a specific role to 
organisational identities and discourses, that do not necessarily match realities on the ground. 
For instance, the stressing of principles may be understood as important, effective and 
relevant in the eye of the aid giver, but irrelevant to aid receivers and local authorities. It is 
important to reflect on how humanitarianism is represented in academia, and how emergency 
discourses and problem-solving perspectives shape our analyses (Bakewell 2008; Barnett 
2008). Similarly, it is important to recognise the differences between how humanitarianism is 
represented and how it actually materializes on the ground may be tainted by aid centred and 
normative perspectives.  
 
This paper explores how negotiating access is related to this ambiguous duality of 
exceptionalism and embeddedness of contemporary humanitarian governance. More 
specifically it looks at how aid actors perceived and organized these negotiations around 
understandings of (in)security. In the next paragraphs, after a short methodological note,  I 
will first reconsider this paradox of a humanitarianism in relation to the political. Then I will 
discuss how humanitarian action became increasingly embedded as part of a humanitarian 
protectorate, which not only implies a political role and position in relation to the larger 
international community, including international military forces, but also inherently affects 
the relation between aid and the state. Lastly, I will discuss how this impacts on relations 
between humanitarian and state actors. I will argue that the gaining and maintaining of 
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humanitarian access sustained a political economy of aid. The result is that refusing, 
frustrating or endangering access is not so much an abuse or misunderstanding of 
humanitarian assistance to people in need, but rather the mediation of a potentially powerful 
humanitarian protectorate.  
 
METHODOLOGY 
The study is based on ethnographic fieldwork carried out between February 2011 and 
December 2013, as part of a larger project studying aid and insecurity. Six field trips were 
made for a total of eight months, in which I visited and interviewed NGOs, UN agencies and 
government staff in their field locations and head offices. A considerable amount of data 
gathering had a more informal character, and comprised of conversations, observations and 
‘hanging out’ with aid staff and local people in the everyday environment in which 
humanitarianism takes shape. The research population represents a mixture of international 
and national staff from humanitarian NGOs and UN agencies, local authorities, and the 
general public that I approached in various locations all over South Sudan, such as Juba, 
Rumbek, Wau, Yambio, Yei, Malakal, Bor and Aweil, but also many smaller places as part of 
a motorcycle journey criss-crossing 8 out of (then) 10 states to also get an understanding of 
humanitarian negotiations and programming in smaller field locations.  
In order to gain an understanding of this environment and the experiences and positioning of 
aid actors, this study applied ethnography to study humanitarian agencies, rationales and 
programs and its effects, also referred to aidnography. This allowed for an actor oriented 
approach to study crisis response, in which contradictions, personality and positionality are 
taken into consideration to analyse how everyday practices, perceptions and perspectives of 
aid are the outcome of social negotiation.  
 
Although problematic from a methodological point of view, almost without exception, this 
research took place under conditions of anonymity. As a result, the presented field data is 
largely void of references to specific UN and NGO agencies, and the people interviewed, and 
the locations where they took place. I trust that the general presentation of relevant field data 
and the theoretical embeddedness is sufficient for a valid support of my argumentation. From 
another angle, this very limitation also highlights how maintaining humanitarian access in 
South Sudan is a sensitive affair, and the condition of anonymity and other measures to 
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conceal the identity of people and their institutional affiliations, is a case in point for the role 
of insecurity in the political economy of aid.  
 
 
HUMANITARIAN GOVERNANCE AND THE INTERNATIONALIZATION OF NON-WESTERN STATES 
References to humanitarian aid as a coherent set of activities that is distinct from 
development, human rights, or other forms of international action are problematic. 
Humanitarianism covers a range of ethical, practical and organizational identities and 
identifications, yet the label is consequently used without recognizing the inherent variability 
and multiplicity, and indeed taken for granted as a clear-cut concept (Donini & Walker 2012). 
Instead, humanitarian practice is comprised of different discourses, expressions, aspirations, 
ethics and programmes, that often intersect or overlap, but also compete with each other as 
part of larger humanitarian aims (Lester & Dussart 2014: 17).  
 
Two distinct approaches to humanitarianism can be distinguished. One is a strictly non-
political idea, often referred to as a Dunantist (after Henri Dunant, the founder of the Red 
Cross), or minimalist humanitarianism. This approach emphasises principles such as 
humanity, neutrality, independence and impartiality as the main determinants and drivers of 
humanitarian aid. The other end of the scale shows a more politically embedded approach, 
referred to as a Wilsonian (after former US president and secretary-general of the League of 
Nations), or maximalist, approach (Goodhand 2002; Middleton & O'Keefe 2006). 
Alternatively, these two poles are sometimes referred to as  ‘emergency humanitarianism’, 
which restricts itself solely to life-saving activities and ‘alchemical humanitarianism’ which 
seeks to remove the causes of suffering, and moves closer to the field of development (Barnett 
2011: 22).  
 
Although many humanitarian actors position and identify themselves somewhere near the 
minimalist positions, in practice they allow themselves various degrees of politicization, and 
the two poles are much more practically and historically interrelated. One school of thought 
sees this politicization, or alchemical humanitarianism, as a recent post 9/11 development, and 
as a regression from an earlier period of ‘successful’, ‘pure’ and ‘ethical’ humanitarianism 
(Fassin 2012), in which the principles of impartiality, neutrality and independence were 
respected (Barnett 2011: 2-5; Smillie 2012). This idea of a pure and ethical humanitarianism 
fails to recognise other, inherently liberal, parallels to earlier modes of global governance that 
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used the language of humanitarianism without taking such a principled position (Barnett 
2011; Lester & Dussart 2014; Redfield & Bornstein 2011; Reid-Henry 2014; Smillie 2012).  
 
Humanitarianism conveys several things at once: ‘a structure of feeling, a cluster of moral 
principles, a basis for ethical claims and political strategies, and a call for action’ (Redfield & 
Bornstein 2011: 17). It includes the strictly principled stance of NGOs such as Médecins sans 
Frontières (MSF), the workings of multi-mandated NGOs such as Oxfam, the religious drives 
of groups like Samaritans Purse or the activism of Non-Violent Peace Force, but also the 
understanding of humanitarian NGOs as ‘force multipliers’ as uttered by US Secretary of 
State Collin Powell in the struggle for hearts and minds in the War on Terror (Barnett & 
Weiss 2008) and the actual military action that took place under the label ‘humanitarian 
intervention’, such as during the Kosovo and Libya campaigns.  
 
This broad understanding of humanitarianism as a ‘collection of interventions’ (Veit 2010) 
makes that there are many ways in which individual humanitarian action relates to target 
States and indeed to the notion of global governance.  What they share in common however, 
is a motivation to intervene, that others have referred to as a ‘will to care’ (Reid-Henry 2014), 
or a ‘will to govern’ (Duffield 2007). They imply an entitlement to act and intervene on behalf 
of others, legitimized by narratives of disaster, emergency and crisis, which necessitate 
outside interference and allow international actors the space to do so.  
 
As humanitarians became increasingly involved in post-conflict reconstruction, peace and 
state building and so on, they became part of wider political networks with other international 
actors that are not primarily driven by humanitarian considerations (Barnett 2011), and 
operational engagements are tied to the political agendas and funding of western 
governments, and as a result they are not politically neutral and not impartial (Collinson & 
Duffield 2013: 10; Hammond 2008). Rather, they are part of a ‘mobile sovereignty’ joined in 
a ‘common project of the need to intervene’ (Pandolfi 2010: 239).   
 
These ‘laboratories of post-national democracy’ (Pandolfi 2010) are states of exception, in 
which the power of the interveners takes on an extra-legal quality that involves the imposition 
of the very logic of intervention – the humanitarian idea (Agier & Bouchet-Saulnier 2004). 
Goodhand notes how ‘the aid community used the motif of the “failed state” to assume and 
justify itself as a “surrogate government”’ (2002: 844). The result is the internationalization of 
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(non-western) states, with associations and labels as ‘white jeep states’ (Sampson in Redfield 
& Bornstein 2011: 24), ‘governance states’ (Bliesemann de Guevara 2012a: 11), or ‘state-
building states’ (Anderson 2012), all of which indicate a blurring of international and local 
forms of governance, and accord a powerful role for the international aid community in local 
governance.   
 
The merging of humanitarianism with post-conflict state building, peace building and military 
intervention resonates with a ‘post-politics’ of aid, in which humanitarianism is proclaimed as 
exceptional, temporary, and ethical action, while its outcome and praxis shows intimate forms 
of political governance and steering. Stern and Öjendal (2010) note a similar tendency in 
‘development’, noting the gap between what is done in the name of development and what 
development actually is on the ground. The recognition of post-humanitarianism as a ‘trompe 
l'oeil‘ (Apthorpe 2011), an image of ethical, non-political action which becomes something 
else the very moment it materializes, is one useful way of viewing the ambiguities of 
humanitarian governance.    
 
However, the power behind the governmental roles and public service delivery of 
international aid remains elusive. Andersen uses the phrase ‘tacit trusteeship’ to capture this 
blurring of international and local authority in post-conflict state-building interventions, in 
which international control is ‘neither entirely imposed on the state, nor fully voluntary’ 
(2012: 133). She goes on to say that ‘international authority must remain undeclared as a 
result of the paradoxical effect of both controlling and empowering (ibid). In other words, in 
order for international actors to build and support a legitimate state, their influence and power 
need to remain tacit, otherwise they compromise the very legitimacy of the state they are 
seeking to build. The language of partnership, capacity building and cooperation is all part of 
this package of tacit trusteeship, yet on the ground, the values implied in this arrangement, 
such as equality, participation and sharing, take on a different shape, and brings different 
power processes to light. 
 
In humanitarianism, forms of tacit trusteeship manifest in language, labels and principles, 
representing action as temporary, non-political and external support. Yet in practice, 
reverberating Duffield’s image of a ‘radicalization of aid’, humanitarian programmes manage 
people, ideas, and space, in collaboration with local authorities and other agencies, instigated 
by the desire to link relief to development and the experiment of post-conflict reconstruction. 
11 
 
As a result, humanitarians that stressed their exceptionality and independence towards non-
humanitarian programs and other actors in the international community, simultaneously had 
become embedded with them in various ways, not only in terms of programming, but also 
with regards to security management.   
 
THE HUMANITARIAN PROTECTORATE OF SOUTH SUDAN 
When I visited Pibor town in Jonglei state at the end of 2012, new humanitarian structures had 
just been rebuilt after being destroyed when the town was overrun by a militia at the end of 
2011. An estimated 8,000 ethnic Nuer youth, who called themselves ‘the White Army’, 
marched into Pibor; the terrified Murle population fled into the bush, aid staff were evacuated, 
and the town’s infrastructure was destroyed.  
 
One year later, the aid agencies rebuilt their compounds adjacent to the new compound of the 
Indian Battalion of the United Nations Mission in South Sudan (UNMISS). The walls around 
the UNMISS compound were unmistakably higher than those of the humanitarians’, which 
were little more than thorn fences, apart from the sections where their compounds touched. 
The soldiers and the humanitarians were only separated by this wall, but in case of threat or 
emergency, humanitarian staff could quickly enjoy the ‘force protection’ of the Indian 
soldiers and evacuate to their compound, and from there get into UNMISS helicopters or 
those of the United Nations Humanitarian Air Service (UNHAS).  
 
On the other side of town were some other compounds close together, a loosely fenced NGO 
campsite, where other groups found housing; a corporate organization, rather 
indistinguishable from an NGO, lodged here too. The adjacent compound housed a hospital 
and other NGO quarters. Several times a day, an Indian armed personnel carrier drove by to 
observe the situation, chat and move on. A fortnight before my visit there was a rebel attack 
and these aid staff were evacuated to the UNMISS compound where they spent the night. 
Spatially and practically the humanitarians and the wider mission were separate, yet they were 
together.  
 
The material and spatial practices of humanitarian agencies are easily neglected due to the 
focus on programmatic goals, intentions and outputs (Smirl 2015). But the spatial 
organization of aid agencies in Pibor, and elsewhere in South Sudan, tells us something about 
their embeddedness and relationship with the larger international intervention. Although these 
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aid actors existed independently, they organized themselves and related to each other in 
various ways when it comes to security measures. For instance, a cooperation agreement 
known as Saving Lives Together (SLT) was intended to keep aid flowing amid rising tensions 
and threats.4 The UN’s security department was quite critical about this, stating that the 
NGOs made an effort in dissociating themselves from the UN all the time, in order to uphold 
their humanitarian image, but would expect and demand vehicles, aircraft and rescue if and 
when they needed to evacuate. In an insightful autobiographical account of an MSF staff in 
Abyei, Maskalyk remarks that ‘much of the NGO work in Sudan, however little we liked to 
admit it, was entirely dependent on the United Nations’ (2009: 34).  
 
The tension between UN and NGOs, and NGOs amongst each other materialized in the 
everyday practices of coordination, cooperation and information sharing, or the lack thereof, 
as narrated in many examples by a variety of UN and NGO staff interviewed in places where 
NGOs group together, such as Rumbek, Yambio, Warrap, Bor, Wau and Juba, amongst 
others. While information sharing such as security updates raised tensions on an institutional 
level, this was less the case in the personal affiliations between the people that made up the 
international community. Here, the lines were blurred and came together in what has been 
aptly termed Peaceland (Autesserre 2014), or Aidland (Apthorpe 2011), a shared spatial 
organization of international agencies and their international staff, which may have differing 
humanitarian identities, yet who group together socially in compounds and for leisure, and 
with boundaries being crossed by staff rotations all the time. As I travelled the various regions 
in South Sudan, I met and hung out with aid workers from different denominations who 
congregated together in a shared architecture of “defensive living” (Duffield 2010), the odd 
mix of safari-style and semi-military camps in state capitals, such as Rumbek and Wau, as 
well as places such as in Warrap and Agok. These places breathed the air of a shared 
international environment where NGOs and UN congregated for reasons of convenience, 
security, entertainment and a lack of alternatives, and where they shared cars, information and 
resources, but also sustained an image of a privileged and protected international community.   
 
De Waal notes how the invasion of Somalia, ‘hailed as an experiment in taking over a 
formerly sovereign country as a sort of “humanitarian protectorate”’ (2000: 39) was instigated 
by relief agencies. The goal was to create security for the delivery of relief assistance during 
famine. This represents a shift from protecting civilians to protecting humanitarian actors. The 
notion of ‘force protection’ also became clear in the attack on Pibor. Faced with the approach 
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of the White Army, whose march took several days, the media called upon UNMISS to keep 
the peace and protect the people, but UNMISS declared that its mandate was to support the 
government (army) and to protect humanitarian staff. Many South Sudanese read UNMISS’s 
mission differently and expected it to protect local people but, as was later explained in 
interviews, the protection of the ‘mission’ had top priority. (Since 2013, UNMISS has also 
taken on the latter role in their Protection of Civilians sites on compounds in Juba, Bentiu and 
Malakal where it hosts many thousands of people, a rather new development in (armed) 
humanitarian governance).  
 
A protectorate refers to a state or period of being controlled and protected by another country, 
and recently, post-conflict measures have brought East Timor, Kosovo and Bosnia under 
transitional UN administration. Although there were advocates for establishing formal 
protectorates in parts of South Sudan, i.e. Abyei,5 or for the whole of the country,6 UNMISS 
was not a formal administrative takeover, yet it implicitly took on governing roles – partly 
shaped as humanitarian programmes and non-state public service delivery, and brought 
peacekeepers that carried arms to protect these efforts. Noteworthy are the white jeeps marked 
with ‘UN police’, traversing the streets of Juba and other state capitals that fed the image of a 
parallel government with many people on the streets. 
 
Although aid and humanitarian assistance have been part of the political economy of Sudan, 
and later South Sudan, for decades, since UNMISS there has been an armed component 
protecting and enabling this humanitarian effort, but also tarnishing the voluntary nature of 
aid. UNMIS took shape after the signing of the Comprehensive Peace Agreement (CPA) in 
2005, which ended a civil war that had lasted 22 years. After separation in 2011 UNMIS 
gained an S (for South) and became UNMISS – and was charged with monitoring the 
implementation of the CPA, and to provide support to the new government. As a UN 
‘integrated mission’, the political, military and humanitarian domains of the UN were brought 
under a common organizational structure. The South Sudan project was hailed as a testing 
ground in post-conflict reconstruction and state building, and attracted unusually high 
commitment from UN member states (Pantuliano 2009; Thomas 2015: 82). This involved 
supporting, training, advising the state apparatus, and implementing programmes to serve the 
basic needs of the people, and the social infrastructure of the country. 
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People I interviewed from government and both local and international aid staff, and local 
people, talked about aid and UNMISS in particular in terms such as a parallel authority or 
government. A main discourse on aid in South Sudan, voiced by many interviewees and UN 
reports, was that humanitarian programmes accounted for more than 90 per cent of service 
delivery. In effect, essential aspects of state administration have been managed and 
implemented by international aid agencies and the UN, and legitimized and framed as 
partnership, capacity building, technical assistance, and aid, visible in the many signposts, 
billboards and notifications from the international organisations. This is an embodiment of the 
‘tacit trusteeship’ that Anderson recognized in Liberia (2012).  
 
The former Head of UNMISS, Hilde Johnson, wrote that ‘it was the international NGOs that 
ended up bearing the brunt of social-service delivery to the Southern Sudanese, providing the 
population with basic healthcare and education, and building infrastructure in rural areas’, and 
she saw reasons for concern here since this ‘continued a pattern established during the civil 
war’ (2011: 212) and arguably long before. International agencies became involved in the 
rebuilding and economic development of the southern part of what was then Sudan after the 
first civil war, from 1972 up to the outbreak of the second civil war in 1983, when NGOs and 
the UN became local substitutes for state administration (D. H. Johnson 2007; Riehl 2001). In 
1989, six years after the second war broke out, UN agencies and NGOs, organized Operation 
Lifeline Sudan, providing emergency aid and basic services. This consolidated their role as 
service providers (Riehl 2001).  
Many aid actors suggested that the South Sudanese authorities, and the population in general, 
had grown accustomed to aid coming their way. International aid workers referred to the 
taken-for-granted ways in which South Sudanese authorities claimed aid assets or sought to 
influence aid distribution and programmes. Several respondents argued that there was an 
‘entitlement attitude’ with local authorities seeking to control and influence humanitarian aid.     
 
Humanitarians do not operate in a void, and countries recovering from war are no tabula rasa 
(Hilhorst et al. 2010), and authorities logically claimed their own sovereignty (not in the least 
because of the state building and empowerment rhetoric of the international agencies 
themselves). The humanitarian project, which by and large had embraced the twin aims of 
aiding people and building the state, needed to cooperate with state actors but did not want 
them to impede on humanitarianism itself, while local state actors wanted to have a say over 
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the distribution of resources and ideas. Some NGOs experienced this as a shrinking of the 
‘humanitarian space’, which became clear by an increase in harassments, administrative 
hurdles and security incidents. Others reasoned that the obstruction of aid could be interpreted 
as a way of countering a large and powerful collection of international interventions, and of 
laying claim to sovereignty. In this reading, the tacit trusteeship between the actors of the 
humanitarian protectorate and the South Sudanese state was mediated by insecurity.  
 
In many ways, and on many levels, local authorities, the security forces, and other power 
holders such as local stakeholders, bureaucrats and politicians, contributed to insecurity for 
humanitarian actors. In response, addressing this insecurity in everyday processes of gaining 
and maintaining humanitarian access, consolidated a political economy of aid. In other words, 
for humanitarians to stay, they had to pay, or give way.  
 
ASPIRATION, SECURITY AND THE POLITICAL ECONOMY OF AID 
There is a well-documented history – if not a genre – of how aid in South Sudan was 
instrumentalised and manipulated by authorities and rebel parties (Millard Burr & Collins 
1995; Hutchinson 1996; De Waal 1997; Laverge and Weissman 2004; Marriage 2006; D. H. 
Johnson 2007; Keen 2008). The manipulation and instrumentalisation of aid is as old as 
humanitarianism itself (Magone et al. 2011; Donini 2012). In the insightful and reflexive (or 
perhaps apologetic) MSF publication ‘Humanitarian negotiations revealed’, Allie writes: ‘the 
political exploitation of aid is not a misuse of its vocation, but its principal condition of 
existence’(2011). The symbols, principles and ethics of humanitarianism are advocated as 
universal, and the exploitation and instrumentalization of these are easily seen as the result of 
misunderstanding and confusion between aid givers and receivers (Hammond 2008). 
However, the claim that this is down to ‘misunderstandings’ is normative and aspirational, 
and draws attention away from the political economy of aid, and its longevity and historical 
precedent.    
 
De Waal notes: ‘over the years, SPLA officers became oriented towards an apparently 
unending supply of international humanitarian aid, which could be stolen with impunity’. He 
adds that ‘NGOs and donors often connived in this’ (2014: 352). In other words, NGOs 
allowed, condoned or facilitated the abuse of their aid. One reading of this is that 
accommodating demands of local authorities is a part of negotiating humanitarian access, in 
the sense of an ‘acceptance’ strategy in which aid actors seek to foster good relations with 
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local authorities, power holders, and communities as a security strategy (Egeland et al. 2011). 
My fieldwork revealed how aid actors believed and experienced that confronting and 
challenging authorities and other stakeholders with what was in their eyes abusive or 
problematic behaviour towards the humanitarian imperative, had led to a loss of access, 
threats, or an early exit. From this perspective then, allowing a certain amount of abuse, can 
be understood as an aspect of a ‘will to stay’, and is in effect a form of manoeuvring around 
insecurity and negotiating access. 
 
An interesting example was a government directive that stipulated that all aid that enters the 
country should remain there and be handed over to the state after aid programmes end, 
including humanitarian assets such as jeeps, office equipment, communication devices, and so 
on. Many interviewed staff had experiences with claims related to that directive. One NGO 
staff member explained how a local county authority in Raga forbade the NGO staff from 
crossing county boundaries in their vehicles, as they claimed that these belonged to the 
government. The NGO in question felt that it was being held hostage, and in the end they 
closed the programme. I encountered variations of this type of experience with other NGOs in 
other areas also. 
 
Since all aid and aid infrastructure entering (South) Sudan, even during the implementation of 
the aid programme, was claimed as belonging to the government, local authorities felt a 
legitimate claim over humanitarian assets, and this puts notions of manipulation and abuse in 
a different light. These were not isolated incidents, or a phenomenon that only emerged after 
the CPA, but something that had its roots in a longer existing political economy of aid and 
predates South Sudan’s separation (see also: D. H. Johnson 2007: 160). As a result, there was 
a constant struggle over humanitarian assets, their allocation and target audience and purpose, 
as part of cooperation between authorities and NGOs, that in many instances was aimed at the 
betterment of communities and constituencies of powerful local actors, but sometimes also for 
a more individual aim. For instance, there were claims that government staff owned NGO cars 
that they had appropriated and kept at home as their private property. I had lunch with one 
retired government staff who had two in his compound, still marked with NGO license plates.  
  
Challenging, protesting over and confronting what humanitarians described as abuse, 
misconduct, or infringements to humanitarian access has led to what Jok refers to as 
‘bureaucratic war’ (2007: 265) – involvig the imposition of extra taxes, regulations and 
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permits. but also violent confrontations, arbitrary arrests of aid staff, and appropriation of aid 
assets. The insecurity facing aid organizations and aid workers was often the direct result of 
government, army or local authority actions – or inaction – that demanded resources and 
assistance from them (See also: Fast, et al 2011: 27: Bennett 2013: 5; Stoddard et al. 2012).7  
 
Illustrative is an example of a hospital in Lakes state that was maintained, staffed and 
financed by an NGO that intended to hand it over to the state Ministry of Health after the 
initial phase. The NGO experienced threats and harassment because the state demanded that 
the NGO continue with its programme and was forced to continuing operating the program 
for some time, before abandoning the project, and the state, altogether due to the soured 
relation and the threats. Similar examples were given, with many having regular experiences 
of ministries or county officials seeking to influence the distribution of aid resources: where 
and when to stock clinics with medicines and other provisions, where to build schools, and 
who to employ, such as relatives and clan members. Through such strategies, local power 
brokers benefited their own communities and gained political legitimacy: they could claim aid 
delivery was the result of their own efforts to support their constituencies and they could 
make life difficult for NGOs if their demands were not met by rallying the very communities 
to act against the very aid agencies in case of non-compliance, or threats thereto.   
 
In many cases, NGOs stayed but had to deal with demanding authorities and manoeuvre their 
way through these situations, by underplaying them, refraining from reporting them or 
complaining publicly, or finding other ways around the situation in order to remain operative. 
The UN Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs (OCHA) compiled and 
published a report about government abuses, harassment and neglect on behalf of NGOs, who 
feared retribution if they made independent reports.8  
 
The question is to what extent not speaking out publicly against such threats and interference, 
turning a blind eye to it, providing a small kickback, or giving in to a demand from a specific 
authority, help consolidate and constitute an political economy of aid that is in part based on 
threat. The lines between an interfering authority, and a partnership where the local authority 
is accorded a decision making role, can be thin. It is not always clear what is abuse, and what 
is not, nor whether there is an infringement of humanitarian space, especially when 
humanitarian activities have crept into programmes of state building. Moreover, perceptions 
can differ between people and institutional mandates. During my field work it was difficult to 
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distinguish concerns, principles, personal ethics, and institutional reputations. Aid actors 
presented and positioned themselves in the field in myriad ways, and there were large 
complexities and variations in the arrangements between them and government agencies.  
 
One interviewee referred to the very rationale of the government seeking to restrict NGOs  
from a state perspective as misplaced, and stated: ‘as if NGOs can undermine state 
sovereignty’ implicitly dismissing the suggestion altogether. Yet, as Autesserre notes, ‘the 
expatriates’ narrative that they come to “help” host populations enables them to claim the 
moral high ground, while symbolic and material resources place expatriates in a dominant 
position’ (2014: 250). This dominant position, and the claim for humanitarian space for 
maintaining operational presence and access, reflects the exceptionality that humanitarian 
workers lay claim to. However, these claims were countered by demands by local power 
holders seeking influence over aid assets and programmes. By thwarting aid, local authorities 
found a way to exert some sovereignty over the humanitarians, and other international actors. 
By making the humanitarians feel insecure the local authorities were able to keep a check on 
international interference, and indeed the roll-out of a humanitarian protectorate. 
 
To return to Veit’s (2010) exposé about intermediaries in indirect governance, it became clear 
during the interviews that for both aid workers and local authorities, access was very much, 
dependent on personal capacities, relations and motivations. As such we cannot adopt a 
blanket notion of corruption, neo-patrimonialism or abuse. Some collaborations with local 
authorities worked very well, while other areas were more challenging than others – the 
problematic states and regions could be pinpointed quite easily, for instance Raga, Lakes and 
Warrap were seen as notorious, whereas Western and Central Equatoria were considered more 
easy. To some extent these differentiations were part of ethnic relations between local and 
state power, specifically in Warrap and Lakes, which allowed for a certain impunity of local 
powerholders, that was absent in other areas. Yet in other places such as Jonglei and Unity, 
there was history of impunity due to local pockets of rebellion, and the armed responses of the 
state. As a general pattern, aid staff, almost without exception, saw the relations between them 
and state actors as difficult.  
 
This resonates with Marriage’s observation of the Sudanese government as ‘a distant, anti-
development force’ (2006: 123). Although she was referring to a pre-separation context, 
observations since independence indicate that the government of South Sudan quickly became 
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another (and according to some a more extreme) version of the Khartoum government when it 
comes to dealing with NGOs. One way of facing the powerful ‘republic of NGOs’ (as 
Schuller (2012) described Haiti, where NGOs tended to side line and bypass the government) 
is by creating insecurity, or other hurdles. Rather than being the outcome of a dysfunctional 
system, this might be instrumental in the sense of protecting sovereignty on the local level, or 
a sense thereof.  
 
Humanitarians’ ‘will to stay’ and their negotiating of humanitarian access is one way in which 
humanitarians become part of a neo-patrimonial network. As Veit notes about DRCongo, 
‘through reliance on powerful local forces, interventions are generally likely to modify, if not 
only reproduce, pre-conflict forms of political exchange, rather than being able to implement 
new patterns of power and domination’ (Veit 2010: 36). In South Sudan this implies that aid 
actors have to negotiate their presence, balancing between practical considerations and 
principled ideas, thwarting authorities and circumventing local complexities. These may well 
include ‘abuse’ of aid resources, and legitimizing the very ‘abusers’ along the way, by 
accommodating them in one way or another because of the will to stay. The history and praxis 
of negotiating humanitarian access shows that it is difficult to separate humanitarian agencies 
from the patrimonial state. The paradox of humanitarianism, although opportunistically 
dissociated from the larger post-conflict intervention, is that it is simultaneously embedded as 
part of a wider humanitarian protectorate that is contested, challenged and opposed.  
 
CONCLUSION 
In this paper I have explored the relation between humanitarian aid and insecurity in South 
Sudan between 2011 and 2013. The experiences with insecurity for aid agencies at the hand 
of local authorities, armed forces and others, can be understood as part of everyday practices 
of negotiating and maintaining humanitarian access. Perceiving this insecurity as violations 
and abuses of a pure, moral and practical humanitarianism, reflects a narrow and problematic 
understanding of humanitarianism as normative, principal and practical action. Instead, 
humanitarian action in South Sudan in practice was largely embedded in broader peace and 
state building programmes and co-operations. Although many aid actors positioned 
themselves as principled and exceptional humanitarian actors, in practice they were part of, 
and maintained, a political economy of aid that was constantly negotiated and contested, 
particularly because of the governmental roles and to some extent aspirations of the 
international organisations. In this understanding, insecurity was a symptom of the blurring of 
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international and local forms of power, and a check on a potentially powerful humanitarian 
protectorate. 
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NOTES 
                                                 
1 South Sudan: country of dreams; www.aljazeera.com/programmes/faultlines/2015/04/south-sudan-country-
dreams-150414080912909.html  
2 Similar relations emerged over the consolidation of patrimonial rule in pre-war Afghanistan (see Goodhand, 
2002). 
3 See the leaked report: http://www.nyamile.com/2015/03/07/draft-report-of-the-au-commission-of-inquiry-on-
south-sudan/. Concerning its withdrawal see: http://justiceafrica.org/?p=1800   
4 What is ‘Saving Lives Together’? http://www.alnap.org/resource/12932  
5 See http://www.sudantribune.com/spip.php?article55710  
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6 This was also suggested in African Union draft report that was later withdrawn: 
http://www.nyamile.com/2015/03/07/draft-report-of-the-au-commission-of-inquiry-on-south-sudan/ which was 
discussed and suggested by people during fieldwork there previously.  
7 “OCHA white paper” (internal document); and “Humanitarian Access in South Sudan, 2011 in review” 
(OCHA internal document) 
8 UN OCHA white paper on abuse (unpublished document). 
 
 
